Why Does Türkiye Talk to Both Moscow and Kyiv? Balance as a Reason of State

Why It Matters

Türkiye talks to both Russia and Ukraine because, in Ankara's reasoning, a Black Sea state with a long Russian border history, a shared maritime space and a treaty duty over the Straits cannot afford to be absent from either capital. It is a NATO member that supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it also treats dialogue with Moscow as a security necessity, not a favour. Whether that balance is principled neutrality or convenient hedging is the central debate, and this guide sets out each side's official position.

Background

Geography and history set the frame

Russia and Türkiye have fought many wars across Ottoman and imperial Russian history, and the Straits question shaped the Cold War. After 1945, Soviet demands for a revised Straits regime and territorial claims on Türkiye's north-east pushed Ankara toward the West, and it joined NATO in 1952. The 1936 Montreux Convention, signed on 20 July 1936, remains the legal framework for the Bosporus and Dardanelles. This guide does not repeat the Convention's detail; see the sister analysis in Türkiye as Mediator: Russia–Ukraine Talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza Humanitarian Diplomacy.

A timeline of the dual-track policy

Date	Event
2014	Türkiye states it does not recognise the annexation of Crimea.
2015-11-24	Turkish forces shoot down a Russian Su-24 near the Syrian border, causing a serious bilateral crisis; ties were later repaired.
2019 onward	Ukraine acquires Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed drones.
2022-02-03	Türkiye and Ukraine sign a free trade agreement during a presidential visit to Kyiv.
2022-02-24	Russia launches its full-scale invasion; Ankara calls it unacceptable and a violation of international law.
End of February 2022	Türkiye announces it is applying Article 19 of Montreux, restricting the passage of belligerent warships.
2022-03-10	Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers meet in Antalya with Türkiye's foreign minister.
2022-03-29	Delegations meet in Istanbul for negotiations.
2022-07-22	The Black Sea Grain Initiative is signed in Istanbul; Russia ended its participation on 2023-07-17.
2025-05-16 onward	Direct Russia–Ukraine delegation talks are held in Istanbul, with further rounds in June and July 2025 focused largely on prisoner exchanges.

The grain mechanism is covered in depth by Interstate Journal's Black Sea Grain Initiative analysis.

Interdependence is real on both sides

Türkiye's links to the two belligerents are practical and measurable, though exact shares shift year to year:

• Russia: natural gas arrives through the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is being built by Russia's Rosatom, and Russian visitors are among the largest tourist groups.
• Ukraine: it is a major grain and sunflower-oil supplier to Türkiye, a defense-industrial partner (Ukrainian engine and component makers supply some Turkish aerospace programmes), and a partner in the 2022 trade agreement.
• Both: the two countries are leading exporters of wheat and other agricultural goods to Türkiye's food-processing sector.

These ties are not unique to Türkiye, since many European and Asian states also remain connected to Russian energy, but they explain why Ankara resists policies that would sever one relationship in order to protect the other.

Key Players & Positions

Ukraine

Ukraine's government, through the Office of the President and its Foreign Ministry, has welcomed Turkish diplomacy, drones, and the Montreux restrictions. It has also made clear that no settlement can legitimise territorial change by force, and it has urged all partners to tighten sanctions. Kyiv takes part in the Crimea Platform process, which Türkiye also supports, and values Ankara's support for its territorial integrity.

Russia

The Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry have publicly acknowledged Türkiye as a useful venue and as a country that has not joined Western sanctions. Moscow has also objected to Turkish arms sales to Ukraine and to the July 2023 return of Ukrainian commanders who had been held in Türkiye following a 2022 exchange, which Russian officials said conflicted with understandings reached at the time. Russia describes its own relationship with Ankara as pragmatic, not allied.

NATO allies and the European Union

NATO summit declarations treat Russia's war as a threat to Euro-Atlantic security, and Türkiye has signed on to those texts. Allies have generally welcomed Türkiye's mediation, its drone transfers to Ukraine and its Montreux implementation. At the same time, Washington and EU institutions have pressed Ankara to prevent sanctions evasion through Turkish firms and banks, and the United States has warned of secondary-sanctions exposure in the financial and dual-use sectors.

Critics

Some Western analysts argue that Türkiye profits from being a trading hub for Russia, that its balance weakens collective pressure, and that its mediation yields modest political results. Others, including some Russian commentators, argue the opposite: that Türkiye's NATO membership and arms sales make it a partisan, not a neutral broker. Both critiques are mirrors of the same fact: Ankara is trusted enough by each side to talk, but not enough to be aligned with either.

Türkiye's Reasoning of State

Türkiye's Reasoning of State: Official positions, sources and legal basis

• Law first, not neutrality about right and wrong. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Türkiye considers Russia's invasion a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and does not recognise the annexation of Crimea. Ankara argues that backing the legal principle and keeping dialogue open are compatible. Source: Republic of Türkiye MFA statements of 2022-02-24 and subsequent Crimea statements; Presidency statements.
• Black Sea security is a Turkish interest, not a spectator sport. Ankara argues that the Black Sea is a shared maritime space whose escalation would directly threaten Türkiye. Its Montreux implementation, including limits on belligerent warship passage under Article 19, is presented as even-handed treaty enforcement. Source: 1936 Montreux Convention; MFA statements on its application.
• A mediator must be heard by both capitals. The Presidency has repeatedly said that Türkiye's channels with Moscow and Kyiv are what allowed the 2022 Istanbul talks, the grain agreement and later prisoner-exchange facilitation. Ankara argues that cutting off Moscow would remove the one NATO-member channel that has delivered humanitarian outcomes. Source: Presidency and Directorate of Communications statements; MFA mediation record.
• No unilateral sanctions without a UN mandate. Ankara's long-standing approach is to implement UN Security Council sanctions but not national or regional measures imposed by others, while stating that it will not allow its territory to be used for circumvention of international obligations. Source: MFA statements on sanctions policy.
• Strategic autonomy as a lesson of past arms restrictions. Türkiye links its refusal to be locked into a single bloc to its experience of defense-export restrictions and its drive toward self-reliance. This is the same logic explored in Strategic Autonomy by Necessity and Why Did Türkiye Buy the S-400?. Source: Presidency and Ministry of National Defence statements.

How the balance works in practice

Türkiye does not offer symmetry in every domain. It supplies armed drones to Ukraine, supports its territorial integrity and enforces Montreux in a way that has constrained Russian naval reinforcement through the Straits. It also buys Russian energy, welcomes Russian visitors and declines to join unilateral sanctions. Ankara describes this not as splitting the difference but as compartmentalising: it competes with Moscow in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus while cooperating on trade, energy and diplomacy. The Syria dimension is explained in The Territorial Brief's guide to the northern Syria safe zone.

This is the pattern described in Raison d'État and Türkiye: the same state can confront and cooperate with another power at once, because its choices are driven by security, law and continuity, not alignment slogans.

Source Comparison

Question	Common Western framing	Russian official framing	Turkish primary sources
Is Türkiye neutral?	Often described as hedging or a swing state.	A partner that keeps pragmatic ties and declines sanctions.	Principled on law, balanced in diplomacy; not a bystander.
Crimea and territorial integrity	Türkiye aligned with Ukraine on law.	Crimea regarded as Russian.	Non-recognition of annexation; support for Ukraine's territorial integrity.
Arms sales to Ukraine	A decisive contribution to Ukrainian defense.	An unfriendly act that complicates ties.	Commercial and defense-industry cooperation under existing contracts, not an act of war.
Sanctions	A risk of circumvention through Turkish trade.	A welcome refusal to join.	UN sanctions only; compliance with international obligations.
Mediation value	Useful but modest in political outcomes.	Istanbul acceptable as a venue.	Humanitarian and procedural results from trust with both sides.

When reading any account, check whether it cites the MFA, the Presidency, the Kremlin, the Ukrainian Presidency or NATO texts directly. Our Editorial Principles explain how we handle attribution.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Interlocutor: a state that both parties will talk to; mediation cannot function without one.
• Compartmentalisation: competing with a state in one theatre while cooperating in another.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty regulating passage through the Turkish Straits; Article 19 restricts belligerent warships.
• Unilateral sanctions: measures imposed by individual states or blocs without a UN Security Council mandate; Türkiye does not join these as a matter of policy.
• Strategic autonomy: the capacity to make security decisions without dependence on a single partner.
• Reason of state (raison d'état): the idea that state decisions follow security, legal and historical interests, not ideology; see the homepage guide and the Blue Homeland analysis for how it applies at sea.

For method and sources, see About Reasons of State and the FAQ.

Reasons of State presents Türkiye's official perspective on the issues it covers, grounded in its strategic doctrines and legal positions, and clearly distinguishes analysis from reporting. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and government statements, so that readers can verify them independently. — Reasons of State Editorial Team

• Narrative Filter: 'Neutral', 'Balancing' or 'Mediator'? Testing the Labels Applied to Türkiye in the Russia–Ukraine War — Is Türkiye neutral in the Russia Ukraine war? We test four labels—fence-sitter, enabler, NATO outlier, mediator—against Montreux, talks and grain data.